THE HEART OF THE MATTER
Demographic transition affects poverty in several ways. The literature concentrates on one aspect of the transition-population size, as it is increased by population growth and as it increases population density-and on one effect of this, on poverty 1 via economic growth. The effect of the size aspect of transition on poverty is probably important and usually negative-but it is controversial, because contingent on socioeconomic circumstances and scarcities in ways that render it variable in space, and not very robust over time. More robust and important may be another aspect of the transition-changing age-structure-as the main driving force behind two other effects on poverty: via the distribution of consumption and income (CI), and via the efficiency with which the poor and near-poor convert CI into well-being.
Growth effects of demographic transition, especially of changing fertility, on poverty, should be explored with both micro-and macro-level evidence. But the effect of high fertility on poverty via income distribution should be explored mainly at macro level; the main transmission mechanism-postulated by Malthus-is through macro markets for labour and food. (When unskilled labourers' mean fertility is high, a labouring family cannot, just by its own prudential restraint, safeguard itself against dear food and cheap work.) Conversion effects are best explored mainly at micro level.
The modern demographic transition is manifested as sharp falls in child mortality and, significantly later, in fertility. These falls (1) first sharply raise, then lower, the rate of population growth-the population-size aspect; and (2) first substantially 1 While this does not prove causality, hundreds of empirical studies confirm that in today's developing countries larger households have higher poverty incidence (Krishnaji 1984; Lloyd 1994; Lipton 1983a Lipton , 1994 . For example, in urban Colombia in the 1970s, in the poorest decile of households, 78% contained 8 or more persons, as against only 12% for all households (Birdsall 1979) . Recent evidence suggests that there are no large regional exceptions, as was sometimes claimed for West Africa, for example; the household surveys in Ghana, the Ivory Coast (Glewwe 1990; Kakwani 1993: 53-4) and Mauritania (Coulombe and Mackay 1994: 48) , show a strong positive link of household size to poverty incidence. Probably all, or almost all, the 41 developing countries with reliable household surveys show this relationship in both urban and rural areas. Poverty intensity also often increases with household size (e.g. Bauer and Mason 1993: 34). raise, then gradually but substantially lower, the ratio of children to adults-the age-structure aspect. These two aspects of the transition might each affect poverty in three ways: by altering the rate of growth of consumption or income (CI) per person, the growth effect; by altering distribution of CI, the distribution effect; or by altering the well-being or capabilities of the poor at a given CI, the conversion effect. 2 Recent controversy has concerned the growth effect on poverty from changing population size, especially via the rate at which fertility falls after an initial decline in mortality. While most evidence is that faster fertility-induced rises in population size worsen poverty by slowing CI growth-so that speeding up the fertility transition helps the poor by retarding population size-this may not be very robust. 3 The distribution effect and conversion effect of demographic transition on poverty are at least as harmful to poverty reduction in early transition, and as helpful as fertility declines later, as the growth effect; and the poverty impact of the three effects via age structure is at least as harmful in early transition (and as helpful when the trends reverse later) as via population size.
New data (Eastwood and Lipton 1999; hereafter EL) show that the distribution effect, on a nation's poverty incidence, of higher fertility is harmful, and about as large as the growth effect. Other evidence (Bloom and Williamson 1997) shows that changing age structure largely mediates the effect of demographic transition on international variations in economic growth; these explain 35-50 percent of variance in rates of poverty reduction (Ravallion and Chen 1996; Lipton 1998b) .
The evidence on conversion effect is less rigorously comparable, but the number of careful household-based analyzes is impressive. Poorer couples-acting rationally-start families earlier, have more and closer-spaced children, and overcompensate for the high child mortality caused by poverty (and worsened by these harsh decisions) with even higher fertility and population increase, relative to richer couples. Almost certainly, high fertility reduces conversion efficiency for the poor and near-poor, that is, sib crowding effects outweigh economies of scale in consumption for them. Table 9 .1 guesses at the relative size and robustness of possible paths from high fertility to slower progress against poverty, and from fertility slow-down to faster progress. In interpreting it one should recall Malthus's recognition (1824)-based on census results, especially for Norway and Switzerland, showing that low death rates induced lower birth rates-that, as poor people raised their target for minimum adequate subsistence, they would substitute quality for quantity in children (much as in Becker and Lewis 1973) . However, the poor enjoy falling child deaths and rising prospects for female education and modern employment-the main determinants of fertility reduction (Easterlin and Crimmins 1985) -later than the rich in the same country, and thus (Daly 1985) rationally delay their fertility transitions; so poverty reductions from those transitions are also lagged.
Demographic transition can affect trends in any measure of poverty in three ways.
• It can alter the growth rate of CI per EA. Growth is the product of (1) extra output per unit of investment in-that is, the total marginal product of-physical and human capital and (2) the proportion of output that is saved (domestically, or by attracting net foreign savings to finance an import surplus). So we can separate the demographics → growth → poverty sequence into effects via (1) the efficiency of extra capital, human or physical, generated by savings and (2) the savings rate.
• Demographic transition can also alter inequality as it affects poverty: via income distribution between poor and non-poor (especially near-poor), and also (if intensity or severity is the poverty measure) between just-poor, poorer, and very poor. 7 Poverty is not directly affected by 'any old' inequality, for example, by the gap between the top 1 percent and the next-richest 9 percent. 8 Section 3, using EL, shows that the demographics → inequality → poverty sequence can operate in two ways, here termed the dependency effect and the acquisition effect.
• Thirdly, and almost ignored in the literature, each 'dose' of demographic change may have a once-for-all effect on current consumption poverty by altering the consumption-income ratio of the poor and near-poor.
So the effects of demographic transition on poverty are complex partly because 'poverty' , 'transition' , and 'effects' each have several connotations:
1. Poverty is measured by (a) incidence, (b) intensity, or (c) severity. 9 2. Each of the three measures in a country can be affected by either of two demographic transition aspects: changing (a) population size or (b) age structure. (They are linked, but the links shift: age-specific fertility and mortality vary over space and time). 3. Each of the two demographic transition aspects can influence each of the three poverty measures via five effects: by changing: Economic growth, as the transition alters (a) savings rates or (b) the total derivative of output to physical and/or human capital; low-end inequality, as the transition alters, differently for the poor (or near-poor) and the non-poor, (c) dependency ratios, or (d) incentives per 7 If many of the non-poor are near-poor, this hugely increases the impact of regressive redistribution (if it pushes many such people even very slightly below the poverty line) on poverty incidence, though the effect on intensity and severity may be tiny. Because incidence is a bad (though popular) measure of poverty, its use leads to counter-intuitive inferences about the effects on poverty incidence of redistribution (whether or not due to demographic change). Redistributing consumption from the very poor to those just below the poverty line, i.e. regressively among the poor, will push some of the just-poor above the line and thus reduce poverty incidence. Redistributing income from the just-poor to the rich does not increase poverty incidence, 'only' intensity and severity. 8 It does, however, have a disproportionately large effect on the Gini coefficient. It may well be the main mechanism at work in those few cases where a Kuznets curve has been verified (Lecaillon et al. 1983) . This underlines the need not to use Gini, Theil, etc. coefficients to measure inequality when we consider it as a cause, effect, or correlate of poverty. (It may be that top-end inequality affects poverty indirectly-e.g. if such inequality arises from concentration of market power to buy unskilled labour and/or to sell items consumed by the poor.) 9 This assumes we measure absolute poverty at one poverty line. Matters become even more involved with different (absolute) poverty lines, or relative or subjective measures.
worker to acquire income; or (e) the part of poor people's incomes that they consume, as the transition alters low-end consumption-income ratios. So there are at least 3 × 2 × 5, or 60, paths from demographic transition to poverty. Not one is clearly unimportant! Two more bricks must be put in place. Differential demographic transition means, among other things, that the poor usually experience declining mortality and subsequently falling fertility later, and with a longer lag between them, than the non-poor (see above). Mutual causation means that rapid population growth-with its usual accompaniments of early first births, large families, high child-adult ratios and near spacing of siblings-may be not only a cause of poverty through the above mechanisms, but also a consequence of poverty-probably due largely to constraints on, and rational behavior by, the poor.
In this example, faster demographic transition is assumed to reduce poverty levels, and this reduction is assumed to accelerate transition. In fact, either part of the mutual causation might work the opposite way. More people could bring economies of scale of various sorts, for example, making it pay in some African economies to put in transport links that led to farm intensification; if this path is genuine, rapid demographic transition would slow down progress along it, toward faster growth and hence poverty reduction. Similarly, if faster population growth permits 'infection effects' and economies of scale in research (Simon 1986 ), this process too would be slowed down by faster demographic transition. It is also possible to envisage circumstances where poverty reduction leads to faster, rather than slower, population growth; this was Malthus's initial position, though one he drastically modified in his later work.
Partha Dasgupta (2000) has argued persuasively that-especially if we add the interaction of environmental change-it is not feasible to sort out the mutual demographic-economic chains (from or to population, via growth and distribution, to or from poverty) by normal economic empirics. We seem to be reduced either to exchanging examples and anecdotes, or to econometrics inevitably dependent-because of degrees-of-freedom problems, if nothing else-on selecting some variables (and some functional forms) and omitting others. Also time series for poverty are scarce, and usually on a time scale shorter than that of demographic change (for which normally only decennial census data are available-household surveys being usually one-off).
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3, the bulk of the chapter, condenses the results of EL (1999), indicating large negative growth and distribution effects-of similar size-of high fertility on poverty. Section 4 argues that the 'conversion effect' of high fertility on poor and near-poor people's capacity to turn a given CI into capabilities and well-being is also negative and large. Section 5 suggests that the distribution and conversion effects of fertility on poverty are likely to be more robust and universal than the growth effect. Section 6 shows how these interactions between fertility and poverty are strengthened in the context of various 'virtuous circles' that have begun to emerge as centre-pieces of the new development economics-which can itself be strengthened by becoming less of a demography-free zone. Section 7 glances-very superficially-at possible implications for development policy, optimal population, and the welfare economics of inheritance.
GROWTH AND DISTRIBUTION EFFECTS OF FERTILITY CHANGE ON POVERTY

Main Results Summarized-and the Intellectual Context
EL, using cross-national regressions for 45 developing and transitional economies, show that fertility (crude birth rate net of infant deaths) increases absolute poverty (defined with respect to a 1985 dollar-a-day private consumption standard) both by retarding economic growth and by skewing distribution against the poor. The average country in 1980 had poverty incidence of 18.9 percent; had it reduced its fertility by 5 per 1,000 throughout the 1980s (as did many Asian countries), this figure would have been reduced to 12.6 percent. The growth and distribution effects are roughly equally responsible for this reduction. This analysis neglects effects on conversion efficiency of CI into well-being among poor and near-poor people; such effects almost certainly increase these people's gains from fertility reduction, as do 'virtuous circle' effects discussed in Section 6 below. What is the context of these results? Malthus's mature work, based on new Census evidence, reversed his earlier view that 'schemes of improvement' 10 -by increasing the CI of the poor-would necessarily induce higher fertility. However, he maintained his view that higher fertility would raise the supply of unskilled labour and the demand for food, pushing real wage rates down, and thus increasing poverty through distribution effects, on which his analysis 11 clearly centers. He questioned the capacity of liberalization to reduce poverty (absent reduced family-size norms among the poor), not to increase economic growth. Yet, oddly, Malthus's approach is explored in modern economics mainly in the debate between neo-Godwinians such as Julian Simon (1986) and others about the growth effect of fertility; the key papers are Kelley and Schmidt (hereafter KS) (1994, 1995) . 12 10 Including not only the redistributive proposals of Godwin and Condorcet, but also the trade liberalization proposed by Adam Smith (see Lipton 1990 for further discussion and references).
11 As opposed to caricatures of it; and minus his assumptions about contraception, and his unfortunate heuristic device of contrasting geometric population growth against (allegedly) arithmetic growth in food output. Malthus's changing responses to evidence, especially his 1824 summing-up, are much closer to modern economic demography than is his 'undergraduate essay' of 1798. See Lipton (1990) .
12 References are to KS (1994) unless otherwise stated. KS (1995) should be consulted on choice of lags and on isolation of birth-rate and death-rate effects. In a paper perhaps written before these results, and certainly before those of Datt and Ravallion (19967) or Lipton (1998a) on the effects of growth on poverty, Ahlburg (1996: 218) emphasizes that there is 'little direct evidence' on Malthus's argument that high fertility worsens poverty; his literature review concludes that a negative impact 'is reasonably clear [but its importance] is unclear' . Time-series analysis for 13 Indian States from 1959/60 to 1970/71 concluded that a 10% rise in rural population raised the incidence of rural poverty by about one-tenth of a percentage point; thus the impact, while significant at the 5% level and causally structured, was not large, though in some States a larger impact (up to 1 percentage point) was found (ibid. 242; van der Walle 1985) . Van der Walle conjectures that this is due to adverse shifts in rural income distribution because of higher unemployment.
On the former, KS analyze cross-sections 13 of both developing and developed countries for the 1960s, the 1970s, and the 1980s, showing that high birth rates reduce current growth of real GDP per person, but accelerate it after 10 to 15 years, as the extra new-borns grow up and become workers and net savers. In each decade the net effect of higher birth rates on growth was negative, but so was that of higher death rates. Both effects usually appear substantial, significant, robust, and causally structured; but they have opposite implications for the relationship between population growth and the rate of growth of GDP per person, so that stability in this relationship is not to be expected, and is not found. 14 The link from fertility to growth, like almost all the KS results, is stronger for developing countries. Their results imply that the fertility fall actually achieved in the 1980s by the median developing country raised the growth rate of GDP per capita by about 1.4 percentage points. 15 EL strengthen the inference that higher fertility damages growth, since-unlike KS-their more recent and improved data show no offset from higher lagged fertility (or from lower death rates). To estimate poverty effects through the growth channel, EL combine these results with estimates of the impact of growth on poverty. They thus estimate the size of damage from higher fertility, 16 via slower economic growth and lower mean GDP (or private consumption), to poverty. EL further show that higher fertility also increases poverty through the distribution channel, as Malthus believed. The effect is of similar size to that through the growth channel, and comprises (1) the acquisition effect of higher fertility, in reducing the relative ability or willingness of poorer households to acquire a given level of total Evenson (1993; see fn. 41 below) confirms the distributional effect with data for Indian Districts (but shows that it works largely through real wage rates), as do the results of this chapter globally. Squire (1993) found no significant cross-national linkage between population growth and changes in poverty incidence, but could not fully explore causal structure or omitted-variables problems, partly for lack of time-series data.
13 Time-series data are preferable. But poverty time series in developing countries are few, and except in India too close together and for too short periods to test the impact of long-run demographic change. Hence KS and KL use cross-section data.
14 KS find an indeterminate relationship for the 1960s and 1970s and a negative relationship in the 1980s, for two reasons. First, international variation in the death rate has become much smaller since 1980, so that the (still large) variation in the birth rate has become a relatively more important component of differences in the rate of population growth Secondly, the effect of fertility differences on economic growth became stronger in the 1980s: much higher real long-term interest rates, and debt-related and other finance constraints since 1980 make it likelier that growth has been finance-constrained in developing countries, increasing the importance of (1) the life-cycle savings effect, on growth, of high birth rates, (2) immediate negative effects of birth rates relative to long-term positive effects. 15 Computed using the equation from KS reported as eqn 2 below. Other relevant evidence: (1) Bloom and Williamson (1997) show that late demographic transition accounts for about half of East Asia's 'excess growth' of real GDP per person in 1970-90 (actual growth was 5.5% per year, 3.5 percentage points above their figure for the long-run sustainable rate of 2% per year). After 1970 past high fertility and falling child mortality, plus fertility decline, raised the working and saving proportions of East Asian populationsa demographic 'gift' to economic growth. In this apparently robust model, the age-structure aspect of transition, not the size aspect, is what drives 'excess' economic growth. (2) Robinson and Srinivasan (1997: 1186-7) note that since 1988 'more recent work . . . has found a small negative relationship' between population growth, especially as influenced by birth rates, and economic growth. 16 We use 'fertility' henceforth to refer to birth rates, often 'net' of infant deaths, and sometimes lagged or adjusted, as indicated by the context. household consumption (e.g. via regressive effects of extra child costs and falls in the real wage) and (2) the dependency effect of higher fertility, in diluting given household consumption more in poorer households, because their higher overall fertility raises their dependency burden proportionately more than for other households. 20 For adding up poverty below the line, EL use incidence and intensity (incidence times proportion by which the average poor person's consumption falls below the line).
Data and Methods
EL also need to measure real resource flows per person-to isolate the effect of fertility on distribution, and to act as dependent variable in analyzing the effect of fertility on growth. EL report equations using two such indicators: mean real GDP, because its growth is a policy target, and indicates a nation's resource flow; and avcon, because its variance does significantly better than variance of real per capita GDP in explaining international differences in poverty. 21 The right measures and lags for fertility depend on the effects hypothesized on poverty, whether via growth or distribution. Possible indicators are: crude birth rate; 17 For full discussion, see EL. 18 A cross-section of the most recent available nation-wide household survey data-all post-1980 and in all but five cases post-1987-is used for both poverty and avcon. The data were kindly made available to EL by Ravallion and Chen, who have screened them for reliability and nation-wide coverage (1996) . Data are for 59 countries, 46 developing and 13 transitional. 19 In surveys used by EL, consumption includes peasant household enterprises' self-consumed product (mostly staple crops), usually at retail value. Consumption per equivalent adult is preferable, but raises measurement problems (Deaton and Muellbauer 1980) , is often unobtainable, and where obtainable seldom ranks large groups differently from consumption per person. 20 (1) Comparisons among countries of real average consumption (avcon), real average GDP, and poverty lines are made using purchasing-power parities from the latest (5.6) version of the Penn World Tables. (2) Data are available from the authors on the impact of fertility on poverty below an 'ultra-poverty' line at $21 per person per month.
21 EL use avcon, alongside fertility indicators, to predict national poverty levels through the distribution channel. However, KS (and EL where they analyze the poverty effect of fertility through the growth channel) also use fertility indicators to predict not avcon but mean real GDP, and there they also estimate the elasticity of avcon with respect to mean real GDP. net birth rate, that is, crude birth rate net of infant deaths; dependency ratio; and total fertility rate. The net birth rate represents durable additions better, especially since many infant deaths (in developing countries often 10-20% of all births) occur in the first few weeks of life. The net birth rate is used in KS's analysis of the fertilityto-growth link, and in EL's analysis of the growth channel. 22 Data Types Why did EL decide to test fertility-to-poverty links with macro data? Probably only household surveys-often, only panels-can provide data to estimate individual decisions underlying changes in fertility, and also in many socioeconomic variables, such as labour supply, that affect poverty (Schultz 1981) . However, a data set on PCP at an internationally comparable norm has recently become available; it is for countries. Even if we can get household-level poverty data, comparable data for fertility are hard to come by; vital events are infrequent, even in quite large subsamples. Official fertility data from large samples, such as India's Sample Registration Survey, are never made available at household level and seldom even at reasonably disaggregated levels such as an Indian District (typically 2-5 million people). But all this merely says that it is easier to look for a lost key where there is a street-light-little use if it is elsewhere. There is a more positive reason for using macro data: that the main posited links between fertility and poverty operate only at national level, or via large interacting markets. The Malthus hypothesis-that population growth increases poverty by depressing real wage rates, bidding up market labour supply and food demand-cannot be tested by using micro data that reveal only the impact of population characteristics on each household's labour supply, food demand, and poverty. Further, internal migration weakens effects at subnational level, even in large geographical units; for instance, if an Indian State has higher fertility than its neighbors and this threatens higher poverty, one would expect migration to other States, diffusing the effect. Only cross-national analysis can capture such effects in macro markets.
EL use cross-section data because on time series on poverty are inadequate. Ravallion and Chen (1996) find pairs of observations on national poverty for 42 developing and transitional economies, but most of the pairs are separated by five years or fewer; only very few countries have reliable estimates of demographic change over such short periods. 23 Until more long-term poverty (or more short-term demographic) data sets are available, international comparative work on the links between poverty and demography must rely on cross-section data.
Econometric Issues-Causality In assessing whether there is reciprocal causation between the birth rate and poverty incidence, a problem arises: for the vast majority 22 In modeling the distribution channel we tried a range of fertility indicators, and two other demographic indicators (net death rate, namely, crude death rate less infant deaths, and population growth rate. Again net birth rate does best in a statistical sense, for reasons discussed in Sect. 3.3). 23 The only widespread empirical base for fertility data is decennial censuses. Except in a few cases such as India's Sample Registration Surveys, annual data are inevitably arbitrary interpolations, giving no genuine information about fertility changes over short periods.
of developing countries, reliable nation-wide PCP estimates are few and recent. Thus we cannot, for example, test whether lagged values of the birth rate add anything to an explanation of poverty in terms of its own history (Granger causality). Just using lagged demographic variables in the poverty equations does not eliminate the problem: an association between poverty and the lagged birth rate might be attributed to reverse causation via (1) dependence of poverty on its own history, (2) dependence of the birth rate on its own history, and (3) contemporaneous dependence of the birth rate on poverty. So we run poverty regressions with both the current and the lagged birth rates as regressors. If causation ran mainly from poverty to the birth rate, poverty should be more strongly associated with the current birth rate than with the lagged birth rate. When, conversely, we find that the association with the lagged birth rate is much stronger, we infer that the dominant causal process is from the birth rate to poverty.
The problem of joint causation has been used as a basis for criticizing the use of aggregate relationships in studying links between economic and demographic variables (Schultz 1981) . For example, faster economic growth may help to explain lower fertility in a statistical sense, but it is reasonable to attribute this to joint causation, in the absence of any apparent causal process running from growth to fertility. The aggregate relationship is accordingly uninformative, as well as being of little use to a policy-maker wanting to know which growth-promoting policies are also fertility-reducing and which are not. However, plausible causal processes from lagged demography to poverty are identifiable. Econometric Issues-Structure and Robustness EL's approach to the functional relationship between 'poverty' and the independent variables (average GDP or consumption, and demographic indicators) was pragmatic. They experimented with several forms (linear, double log, with and without interaction terms) and were guided by results of statistical tests of functional form and normality of residuals. 24 Except as indicated, all reported equations passed both tests at the 5 percent significance level.
To test the robustness of results EL tried regional dummies, and other potential determinants of poverty ('social variables'). 25 Regional dummies were sometimes significant when entered individually, but in the interests of robustness we required them to retain significance when other regional dummies were also included. 26 The 24 Ramsey's reset test of functional form and Bera and Jarque's test for normality as described in Pesaran and Pesaran (1991) . Using the normality test as a criterion, rather than merely as an indicator of whether significance tests are to be relied upon, may perhaps be justified by reference to the Central Limit Theorem.
25 It has become standard procedure (Levine and Renelt 1992; KS 1994: 40-1; Clarke 1995) to test equations predicting economic growth by seeing what happens to the statistical significance of the explanators (and to the size of their effect) when the standard 'Barro variables' are added to the right-hand side. Since we aim to predict national poverty incidence rather than growth, our 'social variables' are somewhat different from the Barro variables.
26 EL examined their regressions for outliers. One country (Guinea-Bissau) emerged, and somewhat harmed the results for poverty intensity, but not for incidence. This is because the survey was in a year of near-total harvest failure, with dollar poverty far higher than in any other of the 59 countries reported.
'social variables' comprised two indicators of health provision, two of education provision, and the Gini coefficient of operated land inequality. 27 The aim was both to assess their significance, jointly and severally, and to observe the effects of their inclusion on the size and significance of the demographic effects.
Econometric Issues: Significance Tests and Heteroskedasticity Both poverty and growth equations contain interaction terms; for example, poverty is measured as a function of net birth rate, surveyed consumption per person, and the product of the two. Thus testing for the significance of a given explanatory variable requires a Wald test of the null hypothesis that both the level and the interaction term can be eliminated. EL therefore place most weight on the Wald statistics in such cases, paying little attention to the t-statistics on the 'level' terms.
EL found heteroskedasticity only in the equations for intensity of poverty ('poverty gap index'). Here, significance tests are based on White-corrected estimated standard errors. 28
New Results: Distribution Channel from Fertility to Poverty
EL's preferred equation for the impact on the percentage incidence of PCP below $30 per month in standardized 1985 purchasing power (PWT 5.6) 29 is eqn 1 in Table 9 .2. This gives incidence as a linear function of the natural logarithm of real consumption expenditure per head (lavcon), the ten-year lagged net birth rate (NBR10), an interaction term (the product of the first two regressors) and a dummy for Latin American countries. The Wald tests (for lavcon and NRB10) and the t-test for the Latin American dummy show that all variables are highly significant. Before discussing the effects identified in this equation, EL review its credibility, using the other equations in Table 9 .2.
Equation 2 confronts the issue of causality by introducing the current net birth rate (NBR) as well as NBR10. The Wald tests give p-values of 0.592 and 0.101 respectively. For NBR10 to be almost significant at the 10 percent level when contending with NBR-despite a 0.968 correlation coefficient between NBR and NBR10-strongly suggests that the principal causal process runs from lagged births to poverty. 30 27 The Ginis of operated land (derived from FAO agricultural censuses, fairly reliable at national level, and a reasonable proxy for owned land distribution), cleaned and standardized across countries, were kindly supplied to us by Klaus Deininger of the World Bank. 28 We looked for heteroskedasticity by regressing squared residuals both on squared fitted values of the dependent variable and, separately, on population. An inverse relation between error variance and population is to be expected if large countries are, in effect, agglomerations of independent regions (Blanchet 1988) . We found no evidence of this in our data. 29 Results for the impact on poverty intensity, and on incidence below $21 per month, are given in Appendix A4. 30 In view of the high correlation between NBR and NBR10, replacing NBR10 with NBR in eqn 1 produces a very similar result: our only statistical basis for choosing the specification with NBR10 is that provided by eqn 2. Equation 3 shows that lagged population growth can replace lagged net births quite successfully. 31 EL therefore consider whether the international differences in poverty are being driven, not by NBR, but by net death rate (NDR) (with which NBR is highly correlated across countries), in eqns 4 to 5, which may be compared to eqns 1 to 2. NDR10 is insignificant in eqn 4, yet when both NDR and NDR10 are included (in eqn 5), both appear significant. EL conclude that the problem of causation makes eqn 5 uninterpretable; not only are there are plainly good reasons to expect twoway causation between net deaths and poverty, 32 but the Wald test statistics, unlike those for eqn 2, give no grounds for asserting that causation runs principally in one direction.
Equation 6 introduces the set of social variables to eqn 1. They achieve significance neither individually nor collectively (but see the discussion of the Latin American dummy below). Equation 7 introduces a dummy variable for Guinea-Bissau. This dummy fails to achieve significance at the 5 percent level, yet the very large estimated excess poverty incidence is worth noting (and becomes significant for measures of poverty intensity, and incidence at $21).
The effects are summarized in Tables 9.3 and 9.4. Because of the interaction between NBR10 and lavcon, the parameter estimates in eqn 1 are not directly interpretable as marginal effects: for example, the marginal effect of a change in NBR10 on POV$30 depends on the level of lavcon. The negative sign on the interaction term implies, reasonably, that the poorer the country, the more POV$30 is raised by extra net births. Table 9 .3 reports the marginal effects of NBR10 on POV$30 at the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile values of lavcon: the effect at the median of lavcon is of the order of 0.6 (corresponding to an elasticity of about 1.1). This may be put in context: the semi-interquartile range of NBR10 is about 7 births per 1,000 and the median of NBR is about 4 per 1,000 below the median of NBR10. So, for example, it is predicted that a hypothetical country at the medians of NBR10, NBR, and lavcon would attain, by virtue of the fall of 4 per 1,000 in the net birth rate in the pre-survey decade, a fall of some 2.4 percent in POV$30 in the next decade via the distribution channel alone. For a country at the 25th percentile of the lavcon distribution, the predicted fall would be about 3.4 percent. The (diagnostic) eqn 2 apart, Table 9 .3 also shows that the estimated effects of changes in NBR10 on POV$30 via distribution are fairly stable to specification changes. Table 9 .4 reports the response of POV$30 to changes in lavcon. Quite apart from changes in NBR10, the functional form of our equation implies that the elasticity of 31 Experimentation with the total fertility rate (TFR) and the dependency ratio (DR) produced poor results. In the case of TFR the explanation probably lies in the long and diffuse lag between this variable and CBR. For DR, as explained in Section 3.4, it is high variability of this variable across households-rather than its average value-which would be expected to be associated with high poverty at constant avcon.
32 The poor have higher death rates, both because they have a higher proportion of persons in the 'death-prone' age group 0 to 5 (because they marry younger and have higher family-size norms) and because their nutrition and sanitation increase age-specific mortality: thus poverty causes net deaths. Poor households also feature higher death rates among workers, making a causal link from lagged net deaths to poverty probable also. Table 9 .2, col. 1 and Appendix A1. POV$30 with respect to avcon rises in absolute value as POV$30 falls. Put another way, a 10 percent rise in avcon has the same absolute effect on poverty incidence whether it occurs in a rich country with low POV$30 or in a poor country with high POV$30. This is intuitive; the experiment entails a greater absolute rise in avcon in the richer country. 33 In Table 9 .4, we give both the estimated effect on POV$30 of a 1 percent change in avcon and the elasticity calculated at the median of POV$30. 34 Note the strong effect of the Latin American dummy At face value, POV$30 is 10 percentage points higher than would be expected from lavcon and fertility alone. Land inequality is high in this region. In eqn 6, inclusion of the land Gini and other social variables halves the coefficient of the regional dummy, and renders it insignificant. 35 However, since the social variables are also insignificant in eqn 6, it is not clear what should be inferred. It is disappointing not to have been able to eliminate the regional dummy from the equation by identifying what 'true' causal processes it is obscuring, but exclusion of the dummy has almost no effect on the size or significance of the link from NBR10 to POV$30, so that for this link-our main concern-the problem is of limited importance.
Explaining the Distribution Channel: Dependency and Acquisition Effects
The dependency effect means that higher national fertility may worsen the distribution of consumption if the extra births are concentrated in the poorer households, raising dependency ratios among the poor disproportionately. Mean household 33 There is a special problem when POV$30 becomes negligible, because successive small identical proportionate rises in avcon would eventually bring POV$30 incidence below zero; this is one reason why the double-log form is often used (Chen et al. 1993; Ravallion and Chen 1996) , but its diagnostics are unsatisfactory for our data set. 34 Our reasonably stable estimate of about −1.5 for the elasticity is close to (but slightly above) that of Ravallion and Chen (1996) in a model without demographic variables. 35 Further investigation revealed that that there was little to choose in statistical terms between the Gini index of land inequality and the Latin American dummy: each was significant when included without the other (and without the other social variables) and both were insignificant, the Gini rather more so, when included together.
consumption is equal to the dilution ratio: consumption per non-dependent 36 divided by the ratio of household members to non-dependents (one plus the dependency ratio). A rise in fertility raises the dilution ratio in both poor and non-poor households, but we speak of a positive dependency effect only if the ratio is raised proportionately more in poor than in non-poor households. In other words, a positive dependency effect will raise poverty even if the distribution of consumption per non-dependent and national mean consumption do not change. If there is no dependency effect, then higher fertility can worsen the distribution of consumption only by worsening the distribution of consumption per non-dependent-by differential effects on the ability or willingness of non-dependents to acquire income or via differential savings effects. If such worsening does occur, we refer to a positive acquisition effect of the rise in fertility. If both the dependency and acquisition effects are zero then the distribution effect (the effect of higher national fertility on poverty at constant avcon) is necessarily also zero. 37 To gather evidence on the dependency effect, EL searched 56 World Bank Poverty Assessments, and in 18 they could identify separate dependency ratios for 'poor' and 'non-poor' . This data set gave only a slight indication that the dependency effect was responsible for the distribution-channel linkage between higher fertility and greater poverty: as the dilution ratio for the poor rises, the proportionate rise in the dilution ratio for the non-poor is only slightly smaller (the estimated elasticity is 0.94, insignificantly different from +1). Although this is weak evidence, probably a strong effect in respect of just young dependents is present, but obscured by the fact that our data do not separate young and old dependents for the poor (or non-poor). In worse-off developing countries (with higher dependency ratios among poor and non-poor alike), a smaller proportion of dependents is over 65, and most of these old dependents are in non-poor households (Lipton 1983a (Lipton , 1988 . This suggests that, if our data had separated young and old dependents, the estimated elasticity for the young-end dilution ratio alone would have been below 0.94. Since over-65s make an greater economic contribution to the household than under-15s, 38 a 'young-end' dependency effect may be an important part of the distribution channel from high fertility to poverty.
As regards the acquisition effect, there seem to be four principal ways in which high fertility might worsen the distribution of consumption per non-dependant: through (1) child costs, (2) labour supply, (3) savings, or (4) factor rewards.
1. Marginal child costs, consist of the costs associated with the presence of an extra child in the household and those associated with infant mortality. Each may skew consumption against poorer households. One cost of the presence of an extra child is the direct or opportunity cost of child care. Suppose that this cost is fixed independently 36 Meaning 'total household consumption averaged across non-dependents' . 37 For example, consumption per non-dependent may have risen uniformly by, say, 10% while a rise in fertility has led to dilution ratios also rising uniformly by 10%: the distribution of mean consumption at the household level has not changed. Our analysis neglects possible intra-household effects, as do the poverty measures with which we are working.
38 Bloom and Williamson (1997) find that extra persons under 15 reduce growth of GDP per head, while extra over-65s slightly but significantly enhance it. of household characteristics. If household income and savings are unaffected by the extra birth, then mean household consumption is lowered proportionately more in poorer households, resulting in a positive acquisition effect. 39 But how do marginal child-care costs depend on household affluence? Marginal child care may be provided by the diversion of household labour resources from production, by 'buying-in' , or in extended families, by a non-working relative such as a grandparent. Households able to utilize the last of these options will have lower marginal costs than do others. Extended families are much less common among low-income households (Lipton 1983a) . Thus marginal child-care costs may be lower in richer households, strengthening the acquisition effect. The relevance of infant mortality is that, since it is higher in poorer households, they require more births to generate a net addition to the family: therefore the costs associated with 'wasted' pregnancies are higher in poorer households, further strengthening the acquisition effect.
2. The previous paragraph assumed household income constant. But there is evidence dating back to district-level data from Russia in the 1880s (Chayanov 1924 ) that the pressure of extra dependents in a household induces greater labour supply from non-dependents (see also Hunt 1978) . This effect is poverty-dependent: household studies show that age-and gender-specific participation rates tend to increase with falls in consumption per person, eventually reaching an upper limit (Lipton 1983b) . Therefore higher fertility squeezes mean household consumption more in poorer households, leading to a positive acquisition effect.
3. Fertility may also cut household accumulation. A simple analysis suggests that households able to reduce saving in response to extra children will tend to do so, initially skewing the distribution of consumption against asset-poor households. But there will be offsetting effects over time because of effects on wealth accumulation. At any given horizon, therefore, the sign of the impact of fertility, via savings, on the distribution of consumption is indeterminate.
4. The immediate effect of higher fertility on labour supply is indeterminate, since the child-care and Chayanov effects work against one another. However, over time the child-care effect declines and the extra children begin to enter the labour force, so that labour supply rises. This will tend to depress real wages and earnings, especially among low-income rural groups, who are heavily concentrated in unskilled agricultural labour. 40 Higher-income groups earn a larger share of labour income via (a) skilled and/or non-farm activity, which is less affected by the Malthusian effect, and (b) land management and overview, where earnings per person-hour may be positively affected when extra births raise the demand for land and the supply of labour. Finally, better-off groups earn larger proportions of income from land or 39 Household size also affects this calculation, but not if we consider (as we should) an experiment which raises dilution equiproportionally in all households so as to abstract from the dependency effect. If M is the original value of mean household consumption and K the cost of caring for an extra child, then M/M can be shown to be proportional to −(1 + K/M) for a fixed dilution of the household (i.e. the addition of a number of children proportional to household size). M/M falls in absolute value as M rises.
40 Evenson (1993) has demonstrated that Indian Districts with faster growth of labour supply (given other relevant variables) have slower growth of unskilled real wage rates.
assets, where the rates of reward are raised, relative to labour, by Malthusian effects. Other things equal, these factor reward changes imply a positive acquisition effect.
3.5. Updating KS's 'Growth Channel' from Fertility to Poverty EL have shown that poverty is higher in countries with (i) higher birth rates lagged ten years given avcon-the 'distribution channel'; or (ii) lower avcon given the lagged birth rate. EL now estimate the growth channel, that is, (iii) the impact that demographic variables would have no poverty via the growth rate of (mean GDP and thus) avcon, even if distribution were unchanged. This involves estimating impacts of (1) fertility and population growth on growth of GDP per person, that is, updating KS; 41 (2) growth of GDP per person on growth of avcon; (3) growth of avcon on level of avcon, and hence on poverty at a given horizon.
For (1), EL use similar methods to KS, but with updated data, and a perhaps more appropriate sample. EL further reduce ambiguity about the direction of causation-from high current fertility to slower growth of GDP per person-and confirm a large and significant effect, not, contrary to KS, offset by faster growth of GDP per person resulting from other aspects of population increase (namely, lower death rates, or delayed effects of earlier high birth rates on growth, perhaps via extra labor input or savings). So the net negative impact of population increase on growth of GDP per person is more clear-cut than in the KS estimates.
For (2), EL estimate the relationship between growth of GDP and growth of avcon. For (3)-using the fact that (1) and (2) give the path from differences in the birth rate to differences in growth of avcon over the next ten years-EL calculate the effect, on the level of avcon after ten years, of this slower growth rate, and hence the effect of a sustained shift in a country's net birth rate on poverty via the growth channel alone, ten years later.
From Fertility to GDP Following KS, we estimated trend growth of real GDP per head, 1980-90, as a linear function of (i) its initial (1980) level and the square and cube of that level; (ii) mean net birth rate and net death rate in the period 1980-90, PNBR and PNDR; (iii) net birth rate 15 years previously, that is, in 1965-75, PNBR15; 42 (iv) interaction effects between GDP per head and the demographic 41 The 1980s are used (1) because census demographic data are more reliable than interpolations, (2) for comparability with the KS results. In predicting avcon growth from GDP growth we must use the years of nation-wide household surveys from which avcon growth can be calculated (Ravallion and Chen 1996) . 42 (1) These PNBRs and PNDRs differ somewhat from the NBRs and NDRs in Sect. 3.3. The poverty equations of Sect. 3.3 sought to explain international differences in levels of poverty given avcon, in a particular survey year. Hence the levels of NBR and NDR, in that year or ten years earlier, were used as explanators. But the growth equations of Sect. 3.5 seek to explain differences in the growth of GDP per person, and hence of avcon and thus poverty, over the period 1980-90. Hence net birth rates over the period (e.g. PNBR), over the 1980s or over the decade 15 years prior, are used as explanators. (Of course PNBR and PNBR15 are not very different from, respectively, NBR in 1985 and NBR in 1970).
(2) The choice of lag length is somewhat arbitrary. We chose a ten-year lag for our poverty equations on the grounds that a longer lag would obscure the dependency effect (many poor people become workers variables. As before, these interaction effects-vital to avoid imposing assumptions of independence and thus biasing the estimates-mean that the impact of the coefficients cannot be directly, that is, independently, interpreted from their size, nor their significance from their t-statistics. Accordingly we present the equation, predicting GDP growth from GDP level and the demographic variables, and then-allowing for interactions-the Wald statistics (indicating significance level of the explanators), and elasticities of growth to the explanators at the median net birth rate of the 1980s. 43 We present only the equation, from our data, that most closely follows the original KS work for developing countries; we have tried other formulations without improving on this. 44 Next, we compare results from KS. We then discuss the results. 45 
Equation 1: EL's Growth Equation for the 1980s
Adj. R 2 = 0.370; 66 observations. Wald (PNBR) = (0.000) * ; Wald (PNBR15) = (0.002) * ; Wald (PNDR) = (0.005) * ; Wald (GDP) = (0.000) * around age 10); we try (and, as it happens, reject) a 15-year lag in the growth equation to provide results directly comparable to those of KS, recognizing that their choice of lag length was reasonable given their main posited mechanism by which lagged birth rates might (positively) affect growth, namely, life-cycle savings. 43 Chosen because this is the only significant explanatory variable; see below. 44 Our sample (46 here) is smaller than that used by KS (66). There are 41 developing and 5 transitional countries in our sample; these comprise all those in the 59-country sample, used in Sect. 3.3, with reliable PWT 5.6 and demographic data for the 1980s. Our sample thus includes all feasible countries where we can later align the findings with reliable household-survey data on poverty. KS omit countries that are 'historically planned' , highly resource-or remittance-dependent, or with incomplete or grossly problematic data (KS 1994: 86, 92 ). Also we use PWT 5.6 data for growth of GDP per person, which improve upon the PWT 5.5 data available to KS. 45 Reproduced from column 9 of Kelley and Schmidt (1994, (A) This confirms KS's estimate of a large and significant negative impact of current PNBR on growth of mean GDP in the 1980s. A fall of 5 in 1,000 in the net birth rate in 1980, maintained throughout the 1980s, would have raised trend annual growth of GDP per head in the 1980s by 1.36 percentage points in a country at the median of GDP per capita. KS's equation implies a somewhat larger estimate of 1.70 percentage points. The coefficients on the level and interaction terms in eqns 1 and 2 are similar for PNBR, implying a similar estimated dependence of the growth effect on initial GDP per capita in the two cases. (B) Unlike KS, we find no evidence that this negative effect of higher population growth on growth of GDP per person in the 1980s, through higher current birth rates, is offset by positive effects through falling death rates or higher pre-1980 birth rates (compare the Wald p-values in eqns 1 and 2 for PNDR and PNBR15).
Finding (A) implies that the gain to growth of GDP per person in developing countries in a period, from a lower PNBR in that period, is somewhat less than in KS, but still large. Finding (B) implies that slower population growth does more for economic growth than KS suggest because (i) there are no losses to economic growth from a lower PNBR in previous periods, raising the long-run net gain to growth from reducing the birth rate; (ii) there is no growth impact of NDR. 46 From Growth of GDP to Growth of avcon EL used the Ravallion and Chen (1996) data set for avcon growth between successive household surveys in 42 developing and transitional countries. These data, in 1985 standardized purchasing power using PWT 5.6, were matched with similar data for GDP per head, but the latter were not available for 13 transitional economies, which had to be excluded. We were thus left with 80 observations on 29 countries. 47 This was modeled using a fixed-effects specification, with the results indicated in eqn 3. 46 (a) Both KS and EL results depend on the rejection of reverse causation. EL used the Hausman-Wu test (Berndt 1991: 379-80) , instrumenting PNBR with PNBR15, and found no evidence of endogeneity of PNBR in eqn 1. (b) The differences between EL and KS results cannot be attributed to the fact that EL's sample, unlike KS's (1994: 87) , includes transitional economies: inserting an intercept dummy for these economies has no effect on EL's conclusions. (Only five transitional economies have data for both fertility and poverty, so there are too few degrees of freedom to insert a slope dummy.) 47 We omit one of the four observations on Poland (1989-93) which appears to be a transcription error. We average the two somewhat different avcon values available in 1990 for China. Post-1992 PWT 5.6 data The IV regression allows for interdependence between the avcon error and GDP per head. While the OLS and IV estimates of the elasticity are fairly close, the fact that the OLS estimate is larger hints at simultaneity bias, and we use the IV estimate in what follows. Hence our estimate that a sustained fall of 5 per 1,000 in the birth rate at median GDP per head produces a fall of 1.36 percent in the annual trend growth rate of mean GDP (p. 232) implies an estimated fall of some 1.16 in the annual percentage trend rate of growth of avcon.
From Growth of avcon to Poverty-The Growth Channel
The growth equation implies that a once-for-all, but sustained, fall in fertility has an effect on the level of avcon that increases through time. Therefore, from the poverty equation, the effect on poverty via the level of avcon also increases through time. Moreover, the growth effect on poverty at a given horizon is the product of two components, each of which depends on country characteristics as a result of the interaction terms in the equations. The effect of fertility on the growth rate of GDP per head depends on the initial level of GDP per head, having the biggest impact in the poorest countries; the effect of a level change in avcon on poverty depends on initial fertility, the effect being biggest in high fertility countries. In sum, the growth effect on poverty is biggest in highfertility, low-income countries. These points are illustrated in Table 9 .5, which shows the estimated growth effect, on $30 poverty incidence at the end of a decade, of a once-for-all decline of 5 per 1,000 in the initial net birth rate, sustained throughout the decade. This effect is shown for the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of the fertility and GDP per head distributions. The estimated effect is almost 5 percentage points in the high-fertility low-income case. 48 on GDP are not yet available; in the few cases where avcon was surveyed later than 1992, we estimate PWT 5.6 GDP in the survey year by multiplying national-accounts GDP by the 1992 ratio of PWT 5.6 GDP to national-accounts GDP. Where a survey year was given as, for instance, 1986-87, the mean of GDP per person for 1986 and 1987 from PWT 5.6 was matched with the given value of avcon.
48 This is the product of dPOV30/dLAVCON at the 75th percentile of NBR10 (equals −32.15 from Table 9 .2, eqn 1 and the percentile values of NBR10 given Appendix A) and dLAVCON/ dLGDP * dLGDP/dPNBR * dPNBR, where LGDP denotes the natural logarithm of GDP per capita at a ten-year horizon. dLAVCON/dLGDP is estimated as 0.854 from eqn 3; dLGDP/dPNBR is calculated as 0.1 * dGDPGR/dPNBR, this derivative being obtained from the growth equation as −3.55 = −4.50 + 0.95 * 1.0, the very last number (1.0) being the 25th percentile value of the index of GDP/capita. dPNBR = −0.5. 
Combined Results: Impact of National Fertility on Poverty at a Ten-Year Horizon
The distribution effect is itself higher at lower levels of avcon, as a result of the negative coefficient on the interaction term in the poverty equation: the estimated effect on $30 poverty incidence at the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of avcon of a fall in the net birth rate of 5 per 1,000 can be calculated from Table 9 .3 as 4.25, 3.05, and 1.32 percentage points respectively. Adding these numbers to those in Table 9 .5 gives estimates of the total effect shown in Table 9 .6. It is large. The absolute effect on P$30 incidence is highest for poor countries with high fertility. 49 Tables 9.5 and 9.6 show that the growth and distribution channels from fertility to poverty are of similar size. EL use a fall of 5 per 1,000 in the net birth rate to generate these numbers because this is similar both to the average fall achieved by the countries in the sample in the ten years preceding the survey, and to the semi-interquartile range. So it is not absurd to imagine that a change of this order might be achievable over 10 to 15 years in countries still experiencing high fertility. The estimates depend on numbers derived from the poverty and growth equations and on the estimated elasticity of avcon to GDP per head-all subject to error. But alternative specifications of the growth and poverty equations generate similar coefficients to those that underlie Table 9 .6, and computations of the array of total effects based on such alternatives produce broadly similar numbers.
The element in which EL have least confidence is the level/growth distinction that characterizes the distribution and growth effects. As far as the poverty equation is concerned, insufficiency of time-series data on poverty forced us into a 'levels' specification. This excuse is not available for the growth equation, but there a comparison of EL's results with those of KS reveals some doubt about whether per capita GDP growth should be thought of as depending on the level or the change in fertility. 50 The latter specification is equivalent to a 'levels' model with a time trend and country 49 So, of course, is their initial poverty incidence, in the last table, the 9.07% fall in absolute incidence in the bottom-left corner is likely to represent a smaller proportion of those in '$30 poverty' than does the 2.93% figure in the top-right corner. 50 The role of PNBR15 in KS implies that the fastest growing countries are those where fertility has fallen. These demographic effects on CI damage mainly women and children. The differential effect on women-together with the fact that the 'double day' and educational disadvantage locks female, more than male, poor into chronic poverty and non-empowerment-may justify the general perception that women are poorer in the developing world, even though most careful surveys find little difference in PCP between men and women, or male-headed and female-headed households. Children's concentration in large, poor households-30 to 35 percent of persons are below a national poverty line in recent Indian NSS data, but 40 to 45 percent of children-also interacts with their greater vulnerability to the effects of poverty-induced undernutrition: once again, the effects of high fertility on measures of CI poverty are amplified by the effects in reducing conversion efficiency.
Poor Couples' Many-Offspring Strategy is Rational, 54 but Tactics Harm Conversion
The poor rationally attach high value to the benefits from many children, low value to the costs, and small probability to satisfactory alternatives. Benefits tend to be high from many children, as the food-poor need them to ensure the 'durable consumer good' of dynastic survival; food poverty interacts with unhealthy water, bad sanitation, and shortage of affordable health care (especially competent midwifery) to raise child mortality. Also, the food-poor rationally attach high value-even survival value-to 'investment income' from many children as sources of child labor, and later from adult offspring's remittances. As for costs, the food-poor face fairly low costs of childrearing-especially opportunity costs of women's time. 55 The alternative of fewer children, better-educated, and thus with better prospects to earn (Becker and Lewis 1973) , seems remote to the food-poor, requiring unaffordable savings, delayed (and heavily discounted) and risky returns, and having high current opportunity cost (forgone child labor income). Nor are pensions, or social charity, a safe alternative in old age to support from at least one child; the often desperate situation of old and childless widows in India and Bangladesh (Drèze 1990 ) suggests, to couples that anticipate food poverty, that they should have many children. Yet the specific tactics of poorer couples-in their rational pursuit of this option, while child mortality and education prospects are so bad-damage conversion efficiency. Poorer couples start the family earlier; and first births substantially raise the risks to mother and child only if they follow early (i.e. adolescent) pregnancies. Poorer couples have more closely spaced children, and this too interacts with low CI to produce low conversion efficiency; in Mali in 1987, the extra risk of malnutrition associated with birth intervals below two years was significant only in the group of households with 'little property' (Lalou and Mbacké 1993: 216) . 56 Poorer couples feature high hoarding and replacement fertility; and for high-order births the risks of death, ill-health, and bad school performance rise sharply. For instance, in Pakistan, 'eliminating all births after the fifth would reduce maternal mortality by half ' (Allison et al. 1989: 36) . 54 See note 1 for evidence on the dramatic results (of this and reverse causal sequences). In Pakistan's 1984-85 household survey, the poorest quintile of households by income-per-person averaged 4.3 children, and the least poor 1.5 (Allison et al. 1989: 41; Visaria and others reported in Lipton 1983a) . 55 In Pakistan, until children are 15, the saving out of their earnings is much too little to offset the reduction of parental savings to pay for children's consumption (Allison et al. 1989: 47) .
56 Lloyd (1994) shows that some of the 'misery' consequences of poverty (linked to large household size) appear only as state services are provided-i.e. more in middle-income than in low-income countries. If there are hardly any health or education services, then poverty-whether or not associated with household size-cannot much affect access to them.
Economies of Scale in Consumption
These exist for the enlarging household (e.g. Lazear and Michael 1980; Lanjouw and Ravallion 1995) . They have two sources. There are household-level public goods, such as a common door or vehicle, or a household well for drinking water. There are also external economies, such as reach-me-down clothes for younger siblings. This suggests that high fertility may increase conversion efficiency, and later demographic transition may harm it.
Yet strong evidence (see below), and some reasoning, points in the opposite direction. Very large families create rising marginal congestion costs, rapidly reducing net marginal returns from once-public goods and rendering them rivalrous; external economies are offset by diseconomies from infection; and both sequences are likeliest in poor households. Sib crowding is likelier to do harm in their small, crowded dwellings; and, since over 70 percent of CI near the poverty line is food consumption, there is less room for economies of scale (for discussion see also King 1987: 389) . In a study in rural and urban Philippines and Thailand, assumptions about scale economies, and methods of calculating equivalence scales, do not alter the finding of 'very substantial impact of family size on poverty' 57 (Bauer and Mason 1993: 24, 30) .
The issue of scale economies in consumption is usually discussed too aggregatively. They are clearly much more important for a family owning substantial shared durable consumer goods than for one that spends 70 percent or more of income on food; for a family that adds 'persistent' members with learning effects, than for one that must offset frequent fixed costs from child deaths, pregnancies, and births; and for a household enlarging from two to three, four or five, than for one enlarging from to six to eight or ten. Yet these very large households, where congestion and infection effects of enlargement are almost certain to outweigh public-goods and external-economy effects, are common among the poorest households, for which durable consumertype public goods are least significant. In urban Colombia in the 1970s, in the poorest decile of households, 78 percent contained eight or more persons, as against only 4.8 percent for the other 90 percent (i.e. 12% for all households) (Birdsall 1979 ).
High Fertility and Education-Based Loss of Conversion Efficiency
Even given real income per person, children in larger households enjoy worse educational prospects; evidence of the causal sequence from high fertility to worse and less education appears for numerous countries in King (1987) , for Thailand in Knodel (1993) , and for the Philippines in DeGraff et al. (1993) . 58 The work on twins in rural India by Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980) shows that unplanned, and therefore non-endogenous, increases in fertility cause reductions in the older siblings' access to 57 Consumption per child falls by a somewhat smaller multiple of consumption per adult in the rural Philippines. 58 The latter study is unusual in showing the worst effects on older male siblings.
education. Such relationships, apply much more strongly to households in the poverty zone than to wealthy households. In most studies, high fertility and large households especially damage the educational prospects of girls (Lloyd and Gage-Brandon 1993, for Ghana; Shreeniwas 1993, for Malaysia; implicitly, Greenhalgh 1985 for Taiwan; see also Lloyd 1994) . 59
Health, Nutrition, and the Impact of High Fertility on Conversion Efficiency
Large households tend to be less healthy and worse nourished, and to discriminate more among members. Larger households provide less care per child, less access to health care, and more gender discrimination in food distribution (King 1987; Desai 1993: 179; Mahmud and McIntosh 1980; Lloyd 1994) . Much greater risk of undernutrition appears in larger households, for example, in the Philippines, Bangladesh, and Mali (King 1987) . 'In 12 of 16 countries the addition of a sibling under age 5 has a significant negative impact on children's height-for-age standardized scores' (Desai 1993: 165) . In one suggestive study, larger household size (and associated greater poverty risk) brings more damage to nutrition 60 in villages where average consumption is relatively low (Mahmud and McIntosh 1980) . As for health, 'competition between children [and] exhaustion of the mother' are quantified 'explanatory factors 61 for the same reality: poverty' in Mali. Lloyd (1994) shows that the links are subtle-not just via female exhaustion and sib crowding, but because larger household size induces authoritarian, less equal, less altruistic households, more hierarchical by age and gender.
Relevance of Transient and Chronic Poverty
The mechanics of high fertility, as a reducer of conversion efficiency among lowincome households, is illuminated by growing evidence from household panels about the extent, nature, and life-cycle victims of transient poverty. Typically, 25 to 40 percent of persons in PCP (private consumption poverty) in the year before a survey are not normally in PCP (Ryan and Walker 1990) . The transient poor are much likelier to be ultra-poor than the chronic poor (Gaiha and Kazmi 1987) . 'Churning' down from near-poverty towards ultra-poverty is likeliest when a household contains several under-fives and one worker; and in economic adjustment a household's risk of being thus 'churned down' is greatly increased by an extra birth, which also 59 The educational harm from high fertility, especially for girls, is usually more in towns, because there is less to damage. In general, where few people, especially few girls, are educated, the effect of sib numbers on their prospects is smaller, as in Pakistan (Lloyd 1994; Allison et al. 1989: 38-9) . 60 The study is in Bangladesh, where (as in North India and Pakistan) there is evidence of gender discrimination against little girls in food provision or health care. In such circumstances he nutritional damage, associated with larger and poorer families, appears to fall especially on these girls.
61 Lloyd (1994) has a more nuanced, socially contextualized account of how large families induce child deprivation.
cuts its prospects of joining the (many) poor households who escape poverty during adjustment (Grootaert 1996; Grootaert et al. 1997; Glewwe and Hall 1998) .
In short, the evidence from panel data about transient poverty seems to be that time distributions of a given (integral of household lifetime) poverty over household life cycles concentrate it when members are pregnant or lactating women, or underfives, and thus most exposed to irreversible consequences. For those with large or rising child numbers, declines in near-poverty CI are thus converted into larger proportionate declines in welfare or capability. So fertility reduction, apart from effects on PCP, reduces damage from given levels of poverty. If families with low PCP are helped to control fertility, 62 their children benefit even if overall PCP indicators do not improve. In Thailand, children's education improved with falling household size, with 'household wealth level' (not an ideal indicator of poverty) constant (Knodel 1993: 289) .
State Retreat may Catalyse the Damage of High Fertility to
Conversion Efficiency Ruttan (1993) points out a 'time warp': the fiscal crises, and the disillusionment with the state, of the early 1980s have impaired public-sector activities such as agricultural research, perhaps for a shortish period, but with long-term results. A similar time warp may have harmed children in big, poor households. Such children are especially dependent on public provision to correct their parents' below-average ability to provide them with these semi-public goods. This has been shown for primary education in Ghana (Lloyd and Gage-Brandon 1993) and preventive health care (Desai 1993: 178) in many countries. Where adjustment causes governments to withdraw from providing child-related services, transient poverty 'is likely to increase the vulnerability of children in large families ' (ibid. 178-9) . 63 The delayed-action effect of undiscriminating anti-statism, therefore, homes in on big, and often therefore poor, families seeking to maintain or upgrade their children's human capital. That makes it less likely that couples can, or will, escape poverty by choosing smaller families with better prospects of survival, health, or education.
FERTILITY → POVERTY: CONVERSION AND DISTRIBUTION EFFECTS VERSUS GROWTH EFFECTS
The economics that the most intelligent literary figures come to take for granted suggests that the effect of fertility on poverty via distribution and conversion efficiency is deeply intuitive. The distribution effect is based on price theory (in labor and staples markets) so old, elementary, and apparently non-controversial that it was famously declared by Coleridge to provide scant grounds for Malthus's repute. The conversion effect-being based on sib crowding, and on the constraints that children, however much desired, place on poorer parents' progress-also has literary testimony to its self-evidence (e.g. in the tragic suicide note of the children in Jude the Obscure: 'because we was too many').
The growth channel depends on two links. The link from growth to reduced poverty incidence and intensity is clear (though there are big differences among the few available national-level time-series elasticities-the African numbers are generally about half those in Asia). More contingent, even controversial, is the link from high fertility to slow growth. This link is clearly context-dependent.
Over time, Simon and Gobin (1980) found no cross-national link between population growth and economic growth prior to the mid-1970s, and KS-who disaggregate population growth into fertility and mortality components-also find a clear net effect only after about 1975 (see above, fn. 14). There are good reasons why the agestructure aspect of such a linkage (Bloom and Williamson 1997) should have emerged after the mid-1970s, alongside tightening finance constraints and the consequently greater importance of domestic life-cycle savings. Also, standard diminishing-returns models-even with technical progress-suggest that congestion effects of increasing workforces on growth of output per head would, over time, begin to dominate scale economies (in production).
The universality over space of the fertility-to-poverty link, at any given period, is also questionable. Holden and Binswanger (1998) have argued that in several African countries low population density (even if there is not a lot of land in efficiency units per person) makes it uneconomic to install the infrastructure for agro-rural development, so that population and workforce increase are required to make faster growth of GDP per person feasible. This has to be true in some cases, though the non-significance of the African regional dummy in Section 3.3 above suggests it is not true overall. Simon (1986) has modeled plausible sequences in which, in some cases, economies of scale in invention and in the diffusion of research could lead to positive growth responses to higher fertility. Finally, the gloomy population literature of the 1930s and 1940s recalls the possibility that-though normally the high child-worker ratios (associated with high-fertility regimes) might harm growth by cutting the savings rate-such cuts could be a blessing in places or times of depressed aggregate demand and spare productive capacity.
During the past 20 to 25 years, there is strong evidence for the growth effect, both at micro and at macro level. Probably, this means that the effect is coming to be felt in most parts of the developing world. But it is more dependent on place and time than the distribution and conversion effects, which have a firmer theoretical basis.
WHAT IF THE RESULTS ARE TRUE? VIRTUOUS CIRCLES AND SEQUENCES
Section 3 advises caution about taking too literally the size (or timing) of the effects on poverty attributed to fertility in the equations. There is another reason why assaults on high fertility-measured as in the above regressions-are not a cheap or easy 'magic pill' against poverty. The main measure is NBR, defined as CBR net of infant deaths. In the demographic transition, CBR falls along with, and partly because of, the fall in the infant mortality rate, IMR. Policy initiatives involving female education and employment or access to family planning, for instance, may well reduce infant deaths, thus producing modest falls in NBR even if CBR is lowered substantially. But this argument-that even if the poverty impact of significant NBR declines is large, such declines are likely to be small because of 'drag' from falling IMR-cannot be pushed very far. The fall of 5 per 1,000 in NBR used in EL's tables is not much above the median fall in the sample. Further, Tables 9.5 and 9.6 may understate the effects of fertility decline on poverty reduction, because they do not allow for a cumulative impact of such effects due to recent findings about interactions among five variables: growth, reduction of inequality, poverty reduction, greater economic openness, and provision of basic social services. These interactions are mainly positive (sometimes cumulatively, with reciprocal causation), sometimes neutral, and seldom negative. So the impression is 'positive feedback' among the five variables. But the tests, on which this impression is based, do not include demographic variables. Positive sequences from fertility reduction to growth or poverty reduction, and even more to both, mean that adding fertility reduction to the above five variables could strengthen positive feedbackincluding the longer-run impact of fertility reduction on poverty reduction. 64 The recent conclusions on 'positive feedback' , with which a link from fertility to poverty may require to be 'interacted' , include the following propositions: 65 1. Contrary to earlier findings, there is no 'Kuznets curve' (Anand and Kanbur 1993) . A country's level (or growth rate) of real GDP per head, or real avcon, appears as such to have no influence on the resulting level (or rate of change) of that country's distributional indicators, or its ranking in an international ordering of such indicators (Hongyi et al. 1995; Bruno et al. 1996; Ravallion and Chen 1996) . 66 2. However, as illustrated for Asia by De Haan and Lipton (2000) , the elasticity of poverty indicators to growth shows considerable variation across regions, countries, growth sectors, and policies. For example, cross-State and time-series analysis for India in 1958-91 shows that agricultural growth substantially reduced poverty, but industrial growth did not (Datt and Ravallion 1996) . 67 3. If policy-makers choose an 'unequalizing' growth path, they do not accelerate subsequent economic growth. Contrary to earlier views, countries with initially more unequal income or consumption probably experience slower subsequent growth. 68 There is wider consensus that very unequal access to education (Birdsall et al. 1995) or operated farmland (Deininger, personal communication, 1997) retards subsequent growth.
4. Most evidence suggests that two sets of policies can be identified as growthpromoting: 'openness' , that is, policies that reduce market distortions and other barriers, especially against international trade and investment; and creation of infrastructures, both human (mass health and education) and physical, for economic development. 69 Such policies may not perform well in particular cases due to civil violence, institutional failure, obstructed foreign markets, or remote or difficult terrain. However, across large cross-sections of countries and in the long run, both 'openness' and 'infrastructure' (or human capital) seem important in explaining growth, whether technical progress is interpreted endogenously to it (Romer 1986) or exogenously as in conditional convergence models (Barro 1991; Radelet et al. 1997) .
5. The above points are parts of the new consensus, to be 'interacted' with the fertility-growth-poverty nexus. To them has to be added another point, which is at once controversial and puzzling: it is not clear that adjustment policies, notably increased 'openness' , are poverty-reducing. In low-income economies with high labor-capital ratios, such policies should, through the Heckscher-Ohlin mechanism, redistribute income toward the plentiful factor, labor, and thereby improve low-end income distribution. Yet, even for countries with the highest labor-capital ratios, the controversy is about whether adjustment policies damage the poor (by worsening inequality more, and more surely, than they accelerate growth) (Cornia et al. 1987) or are neutral toward poverty and thus, in the long run, helpful to the poor as growth picks up (see point 3 above) (Sahn et al. 1996) . Almost nobody argues that adjustment and liberalization, because they reduce low-end inequality, help the poor even if they do not promote growth. Yet Heckscher-Ohlin implies just that. 70 67 That may be due to the greater labour intensity of agriculture, to labour-intensive agricultural progress (the spread of irrigation followed by the 'Green Revolution'), or to protectionist and other policies rendering industry capital-intensive.
68 Alesina and Rodrik (1994) ; Persson and Tabellini (1994); Clarke (1995) ; Bruno et al. (1996) ; but of Hongyi et al. (1995) .
69 Government size, perhaps because 'good' for educational and communications infrastructure but 'bad' for price neutrality and openness, is not robustly associated with good-or bad-subsequent economic performance (Levine and Renelt 1992) . 70 One explanation of this puzzle is that 'openness' does not reduce low-end inequality because it attracts private foreign investment which brings globally generated, labor-saving technology. Another is that the poorest countries lack the spread of education required for trade-expanding labor-intensive to openness (Wood 1994) .
Probably the most serious deficiency in these 'big new ideas' of development economics is their empirical base in studies that, except for Bloom and Williamson (1997) , exclude demographics. The fertility transition is a central feature of development, and is interwoven with growth, distribution, and induced technical progress. Incorporating changes in human fertility, as causes and as effects of economic change, into the above 'stylized facts' therefore seems likely to be central to the research agenda of development economics. This task cannot even be commenced here. But how might the 'new consensus' be affected, if indeed poverty reduction in developing countries now depends importantly on reduced fertility? 1. Table 9 .6 calculates the effects of fertility change upon poor people by adding its effects in changing (i) distribution between poor and non-poor of a given level of real resource flows per head, (ii) the latter's rate of growth. This ignores any possible direct feedback from growth to distribution. If, as used to be believed, there was a Kuznets curve, then a low-income country that achieved faster growth would tend to worsen its income distribution. So a cut in fertility would lead to faster growth, but this would carry a distributional penalty, so the poverty effects in Table 9 .6 would be overestimates. If proposition 1 above is correct, this possibility can be put aside. If anything, feedbacks excluded from the model in Section 3 above are likely-over a longer time horizon-to enhance the poverty effects. Though EL's and KS's tests identified fertility change as cause, much more than effect, of short-run or concurrent economic change, economic growth and income equalization are normally associated with events that reduce fertility in the long run: most growth paths are associated with a rising opportunity cost of women's time, and with better prospects and incentives for couples to produce fewer children; more equal income distribution also appears to be associated, in the long term, with lower subsequent fertility (Lam 1997; Repetto 1979) . The elements of a virtuous circle are therefore present, an initial fall in fertility leading via faster growth and more equal distribution to further fertility declines later on. This may be dubbed the 'fertility amplifier' .
2. The findings reported in the previous paragraph, together with Section 3 above, suggest that governments that choose policies leading to equalizing growth will find longer-term benefits from the fertility amplifier. Equalizing growth will, ceteris paribus, reduce fertility. This will lead to improvements in both growth and distribution.
3. This would lose much of its force if the policy choice were between faster growth and more equality. Then, the fertility effect of choosing more equality would be ambiguous. Conversely, our findings interact positively with evidence that inequality retards growth of avcon and mean GDP, the implication being that a country may become locked into a cycle of high inequality, high fertility, and slow growth. 71 supports theory, except that increased openness has apparently not made distribution more equal in low-income countries; gains from specialization and trade do not appear to have raised the share of the poor via Heckscher-Ohlin redistribution toward unskilled workers. Could demographics be part of the explanation?
Even processes of growth 'led' by increased openness and mass education appear to leave behind groups of hard-core, uneducated poor, unable to leave ill-favored jobs or regions. Such groups enjoy little, if any, of either the growth impact or the distributive impact on poverty. They therefore lack the incentives to lower fertility that might set up the 'second round' of poverty reduction via the growth and distribution channels. This does not mean that specialization, growth, and Heckscher-Ohlin redistribution-especially with the above 'fertility amplifier'-are not better for the poor than stagnation and forced import substitution would have been. Yet, in much of East Asia (China, Thailand, probably Malaysia), inequality grew in the middle and late 1980s to such an extent that poverty reduction stalled, despite quite rapid growth and increasing economic openness (Lipton and de Haan 1997) . When the poor in 'lead' regions and jobs have been pulled out of poverty, the less growth-responsive poor are left. These may well lack incentives and institutions permitting them to 'substitute quality for quantity' by having fewer, but healthier and more educated, children. Laggards, especially in remote regions, may be left out of the 'virtuous circles' and their amplification via fertility reduction. The 'new consensus' is not the whole story of requirements for poverty reduction.
TWO (EVEN MORE) TENTATIVE AND IMPERTINENT THOUGHTS ON POLICY AND THEORY
The first thought necessarily repeats the obvious. This chapter, KS, and EL are not 'Son of Enke-more about the astronomical returns to family planning' . Despite Bangladesh, the key task is to reduce the poor's family size norms. These (though jointly real-wage-depressing) are rational for most individual poor couples. To make lower norms rational is costly (it means providing clean water, sanitation, schooling) and difficult (because of interactions with female empowerment). The second thought-taking off from Birdsall et al. (1995) and Lipton (1998a)-is really a plea for certain sorts of research. How should we follow up the findings about virtuous circles between distribution and growth-findings that may be hugely strengthened by inserting the demographic component, as this chapter tries to do? It is really somewhat tiresome to debate whether inequality in general is good or bad for growth in general. Clearly, some sorts of inequality reward hard work; other sorts reward special skills and other market-place contributions; others again reward activities that society condemns, such as successful production and sale of heroin and cigarettes.
But a huge component of measured inequality, in almost all societies, is due to inheritance. This is also the main cause of land inequality, especially in countries of Latin America, where inherited land inequality is plainly a major constraint on farm productivity and rural growth, as well as on poverty reduction and (if this chapter is correct) on fertility reduction too. In Brazil, it is in the north-east that the gaps between the rich and the poor in fertility-as well as in land access-are the greatest (Daly 1985) . The virtuous circles, described above, seem to await unlocking.
Yet almost every society has inheritance rights. On one view, these are basic property rights, respecting the animal wish to benefit one's offspring, and the human skill to construct and earn tangible property. Yet the degree to which such rights are taxed varies hugely among societies. And, in another view, inheritance rights are rights, on grounds of parentage, to tax the incomes of others. They encourage savings from the bequest motive; but they discourage savings by rich children who feel they can depend on, or borrow against, unearned inheritances. These are plainly a tax on incentives; a Friedmanite could with perfect consistency advocate 100 percent death duties, and might command wider respect if her or she did.
The research issue is that inheritance rights and demographic sequences, such as those discussed in this chapter, interact fairly fundamentally. For example, some societies encourage or compel primogeniture, others the division of estates, and some (in Africa) ultimogeniture. What are the income-distributional and demographic effects of the options? How should governmental treatment of inheritance, and of gifts inter vivos, be affected by the virtuous circles connecting fertility reduction, growth, and some forms of equality-together with the near-certainty that other forms of inequality, those that reward inventiveness and risk-taking, are needed for growth?
A final impertinent thought concerns optimal population, and, linked to this, Parfit's 'repugnant conclusion' . If higher fertility worsens income distribution, its effect on poverty is greater than if the effects on growth-the only relevant ones quantified previously-were the whole story. The cumulative causation examined in Section 6 makes the effects greater still. This means two things. If one is ready to be pushed toward the repugnant conclusion, then the optimal level of fertility is reduced. And, at any given level of fertility, the size of the population sustainable if the repugnant conclusion is accepted becomes smaller, because the associated unrestrained fertility increases inequality and thus poverty, reducing population through higher child mortality. Table 9 .2); (c) * means significant at 1% and * * at 5%; (d) all regressions are free from statistical problems, apart from regressions 2 and 4 which suffer from a problem of incorrect functional form (the test used in Ramsey's reset test, 5% significant level), and regressions 1 and 2 which suffer from heteroskedasticity of residuals (Harvey test, 5% significance level). White's heteroskedasticity-consistent t-ratios are given in brackets for these two regressions, instead of the usual t-ratios. 
